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Abstract
I will argue here that the law of nations, the jus gentium, in fact lies at the heart of many
crucial modern social and political issues.
NATURAL LAW AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS: SOME THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
James V Schall, S.J. *
Adjus gentium pertinent ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut conclu-
siones ex principiis, ut justae emptiones, venditiones, et alia hujusmodi,
sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possunt; quod est de lege
naturae, quia "homo est naturaliter animal sociale," ut probatur in I
Pol. [1253a2].'
INTRODUCTION
In summarizing the concepts found in the Roman Corpus
Juris Civilis, Alexander Passerin d'Entreves wrote:
Now of laws there are different sorts. There is the law of
the State, which expresses the interest of one particular
community (jus civile). There is a law of nations (us gentium),
which men have devised for their mutual intercourse. But
there is also a law which expresses a higher and more per-
manent standard. It is the law of nature Yjus naturale), which
corresponds to "that which is always good and equitable"
(bonum et aequum).2
On reading this passage from d'Entreves, it is not altogether
clear what is meant by thejus gentium or how it may relate to the
jus civile and thejus naturale. D'Entreves simply remarked that
the law of nations is "devised for mankind's mutual inter-
course."
Presumably, by this purpose of assisting "man's mutual in-
tercourse" d'Entreves meant that there are rules that can and
should be devised for dealings among those who do not be-
* Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.; Ph.D. 1960, Georgetown, Political Philosophy.
1. "For to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law
of nature as conclusions from principles, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the like,
without which men cannot live together; and this belongs to the law of nature, since
man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Politics i. [1253a2]." THOMAS AQUI-
NAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIEA, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS I-II, ques-
tion 95, art. 4 (Anton C. Pegis ed. & Laurence Shapcote, O.P. trans., Random House
1945).
2. ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTR9VES, NATURAL LAw: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 19
(1965).
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long to the same polities.' These rules would be fair and
agreed upon by reasonable men understanding the particular
situation. Even if agreement is not likely-to agree more with
Hobbes-it is still possible to be rational-to agree with Aris-
totle-even outside or beyond the polis. D'Entr6ves may also
have meant that every polity ought to have at least some basic
rules or laws defining how to deal with foreigners, rules or laws
that every polity was not free not to make in some suitable
fashion. These rules would include norms for basic reasonable
dealings with members of other polities or tribes.
Thomas Aquinas had said that the law of nations derived
from the natural law as a conclusion from principle.' And he
maintained that without this process of conclusion from first
principle, men cannot live together. Their very living to-
gether, their convivere, required rational discourse and agree-
ment about fundamental things. Thomas Aquinas gave buying
and selling as the normal matter with which this law of nations
was most obviously to be concerned.5 One may reconcile
Aquinas's remark with d'Entr~ves's account by observing that
everyone recognizes that if no reasonable and agreed upon
rules exist among people of different nations in their buying
and selling, then no trade will result. We do not have to live
only in our own polity to be reasonable, and we cannot avoid
dealing with others. The law of nations became a philosophic
reflection on an aspect of human reality that addressed itself to
3. See ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTRiVES, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY 32 (2d ed. 1970). The author noted that
[t]he meaning and function of ius gentium has been described many times. It
was certainly the most important factor in [the process of the universaliza-
tion of Roman law]. Under the stress of the growing intercourse with for-
eign peoples, the Roman jurists found in it the practical means for overcom-
ing the limitations and extending the boundaries of municipal law; until in
due time it developed into a theoretical principle expressing the common
element in all legislation.
Id.
4. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, 1-I, question 95, art. 4 In question 95, article
4, Thomas Aquinas wrote that
[t]he law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is
a reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a
conclusion that is not very remote from its principles. Therefore men easily
agreed thereto. Nevertheless, it is distinct from the natural law, especially
from that natural law which is common to all animals.
Id.
5. See supra note 1.
NATURAL LAW AND LAW OF NATIONS
reason, to what was fair and right and correct even in a world
that lacked any sovereign international authority.
But Thomas Aquinas's brief remark in question 95 specifi-
cally said that the law of nations was derived as a "conclusion
from principle." This addition meant that some reasonable
and logical connection needed to be demonstrated to show
that everyone was bound by certain practices whether he lived
in a polity or not. The citation from Aristotle in the responsio to
the same question meant that living in a civilized society was
itself reasonable and according to human nature and perfec-
tion. The reason that law bound anyone at all was related to
the argumentation about premises and conclusions. The im-
plication of Aquinas's remark is that the law of nations binds
reasonable men even apart from the particular laws of their
own polities, because they can understand the argument of
reason and fairness if presented to them in logical form, that is,
as conclusions from principles.
The law of nations, however, does not succeed or replace
the civil laws. But it does present civil laws with an additional
claim to the same rationality that is implied in our living to-
gether as reasonable citizens in any given polity. The princi-
ples ofjustice are binding not only on our dealings with fellow
citizens but in our dealing with anyone. Experience and good
sense may be necessary to flesh this criterion out in practice,
but the law of nations implicitly upholds the judgment of rea-
son to be relevant to buying and selling, yes, even to war and
peace, and to other such things that take place among citizens
of whatever origin.
Is the law of nations that men have "devised for them-
selves" different from the civil law that presumably they have
also devised for themselves? Might we be bound to the laws of
polities other than our own and if so, why? If a U.S. citizen is
in England, why, if not because of the law of nations, is he
bound to obey English law in many important areas? And is
thisjus gentium also to be "always good and equitable," and if
so, how is it to achieve this status? Is there some hidden but
profound meaning to thejus gentium that bears renewed reflec-
tion?
I will argue here that the law of nations, thejus gentium, in
fact lies at the heart of many of crucial modern social and polit-
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ical issues. The theories of the general will and of legal posi-
tivism, both theories that in principle recognize no grounded
principle of discourse other than with themselves, are subject
to some rational limits through the law of nations. Moreover,
the collapse of both Nazism and Communism in this century
has given rise to new considerations of natural law and the law
of nations, of some recognition that national or ideological
standards alone are not sufficient, points that both Walter
Lippmann and Alexander Solzhenitsyn have made with
graphic force.
Moreover, the recognition of not merely the most abstract
of principles but of more concrete ones, not merely of toler-
ance but of principles of morality, has subjected the tyrannies
of this century to great pressure both internally and externally.
In this light, a renewed discussion of the law of nations is of
utmost importance. The context of this discussion and reflec-
tion should be the natural law and law of nations, and not ex-
clusively that of "human rights," which themselves are too
often but code expressions of a modernity that itself recog-
nizes no theoretic basis but general will or positivism. I am not
entirely opposed to every use of the notion of "rights," but the
term is so overloaded with relativism and subjectivism that it is
almost impossible to be used unequivocally as a term for the
content of natural law or the law of nations.
I. AQUINAS AND THE CATEGORIES OF LA W
Thomas Aquinas, in his Treatise on Law, sought to define
more exactly the precise philosophical nature and origin of the
civil law, natural law, and law of nations.6 In this endeavor, he
had to discuss, in addition to the eternal law and the divine
law, both civil or human law and natural law. The eternal law
meant the order of things existing outside of God but as they
were first known by God.7 It implied that the world was not a
6. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, 1-11, questions 90-108.
7. In question 93, article 1, St. Thomas wrote that
God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things, in relation to which He
stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as was stated in the First
Part. Moreover, He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found
in each single creature, as was also stated in the First Part. Therefore, just
as the exemplar of the divine wisdom, in as much as all things are created by
it, has the character of an art, a model or an idea, so the exemplar of divine
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chaos, but an order with related parts and with a final purpose.
Simply because there could be dispute about such things did
not mean that nothing could be known. It meant that the dis-
pute itself had to be part of the reflection of reason, of natural
law.
The divine law meant essentially revelation, the specific
propositional content of the Old and New Testaments.
Whether the Koran or Plato fell under this notion of revelation
would also have to be at least discussed.8 Thomas Aquinas
asked why, in addition to natural law, a divine law might be
"necessary." 9  He understood that revelation was unintel-
ligible without some basis in reason by which to judge its possi-
bility. But he also insisted that the philosopher must examine
all things addressed to the mind and intelligible in some fash-
ion to it. The coherence of all things prevented men from sim-
ply blocking off revelation as if it did not need to be consid-
ered, when it did in fact address questions that persistently
wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law.
Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the exemplar of divine wis-
dom, as directing all actions and movements.
Id., I-II, question 93, art. 1.
8. See LEO STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING 7-21 (1973); Thomas
Pangle, Introduction to LEO STRAUSS, STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1-26
(1983); see also ERIC VOEGELIN, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE (1957).
9. In question 91, article 4, he answered that divine law is necessary for the di-
recting of human conduct, in addition to natural law and human law, for four rea-
sons. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-Il, question 91, art. 4.
First, because it is law that directs man how to perform his proper acts in view of
his last end, and because man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness that exceeds
his natural ability, divine law is required to supplement natural and human law. Id.
Second, as a result of the uncertainty of human judgment, "especially on contin-
gent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human
acts," from which differing and contrary laws result. Id. Unerring divine law is
needed, therefore, "that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and
what he ought to avoid." Id.
Third, although man is competent to make laws in certain matters, such as exte-
rior acts which are observable, he is not competent to judge of "interior movements,
that are hidden." Id. For the perfection of virtue, however, it is necessary that man
be able to conduct himself rightly in both kinds of acts. Id. Thus, "human law could
not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts, and it was necessary for this purpose that
a divine law should supervene." Id.
Fourth, the supervention of divine law is needed in order that no evil might
remain unforbidden and unpunished, because human law cannot punish or forbid all
evil deeds without also doing away with many good things necessary for the common
good. Id.
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arose in philosophy and politics.' 0
To Aquinas, natural law was the reflection of the eternal
law as it existed in actual things themselves." It was their
"normalcy of functioning," as Jacques Maritain put it, what
they did when they acted.'I A thing could only act insofar as it
was the kind of thing it was, and no "kind" of thing could act at
all unless it existed in the first place. In this sense, natural law
accounted for the stability of functioning within the diversity of
finite things. Turtles acted in turtle ways; humans acted in
human ways.
Civil law or human positive law meant that in addition to
reason, which was man's proper natural law, there needed to
be specific acts of reason, commands, that reasonably decided
what men living in groups should do to achieve their purposes,
both of living well and of living rightly.' 3 These purposes fol-
10. See JosEF PIEPER, Philosophy Out of a Christian Existence and The Possible Future of
Philosophy, in JOSEF PIEPER-AN ANTHOLOGY 164-70 (1989). Etienne Gilson stated the
matter somewhat differently, but to the same point:
This final orientation of Christian philosophy entails no a priori exclusion of
any field of philosophical research. What can there be in the whole world
that is irrelevant to the knowledge of God and man? Since the invisible of
God is known from His creatures, there is no creature-that is to say, no
thing-whose knowledge is unrelated to the knowledge of God; and since
the world of knowledge is the work of man, it can be said of man that, in the
last analysis, all his acquired knowledge is about himself.
ETIENNE GILSON, A GILSON READER 188 (1957).
11. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-II, question 91, art. 2. In his responsio to
this question, St. Thomas wrote that
[because] all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by
the eternal law, as was stated above, it is evident that all things partake in
some way in the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted
on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and
ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine provi-
dence in a more excellent way, in so far as it itself partakes of a share of
providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Therefore it
has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its
proper act and end; and this participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature is called the natural law.
Id.
12. As Jacques Maritain put it,
Any kind of thing existing in nature, a plant, a dog, a horse, has its own
natural law, that is, the normalcy of its functioning, the proper way in which, by
reason of its specific structure and specific ends, it "should" achieve fullness
of being either in its growth or in its behaviour.
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 87 (1951).
13. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-II, question 91, art. 3. In answer to three
objections calling into question the need, possibility, and reliability of human law, St.
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lowed their existence and being so that man was by nature a
political animal. That is, his full being required reasonable
laws to be formulated and understood.
Thejus gentium was found somewhere between natural law
and positive or civil law. Aquinas held that the first principle
of practical reason, to do good and avoid evil, was known by
everyone.' 4 He meant by this principle that, even if men would
verbally deny this principle, they will in practice defend their
actions as good and deny that they are evil. That is, they ap-
peal to reason and invite discourse about their actions pre-
cisely on the basis of their goodness or wrongness.
The human exercise of reason, however, included the illu-
mination of what things were to be done on the basis of their
good and evil. To act reasonably, the natural law for human
beings, was not to be merely an abstraction. It was meant to
have an ever more particular and understood content. Thejus
gentium was described as a law of reason, but it was not identi-
fied with the first principle of practical reason, the reason that
was oriented to action to achieve some purpose, end, or good
in terms of good and evil.' 5
A. Jus Gentium and the Crisis of Modernity
The theoretical discussion of the law of nations, ofjus gen-
tium, is a proper counterbalance to the essentially modem and
Rousseauist position that disorders in mankind are due to the
Thomas invoked the authority of St. Augustine, who, in De Libero Arbitrio, distin-
guished two kinds of law, the eternal and the temporal or human. Id. St. Thomas
concluded that
just as in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable prin-
ciples we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of
which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason,
so too it is that from the precepts of the natural law, as from common and
indemonstrable principles, the human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determination of certain matters. These particular determina-
tions, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided that the
other essential conditions of law be observed as was stated above [question
90].
Id. In question 90, entitled "The Essence of Law," St. Thomas stated that this es-
sence requires that law pertain to reason, that it always be directed to the common
good, that it be made either by the whole people or by "a public personage who has
care of the whole people," and that it be promulgated to be effective. Id. question
90.
14. Id. question 94, art. 2.
15. Id. I-I, question 95, art. 4.
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structures of society, family, or property, so that the restructur-
ing of man depends not on his own moral or personal reform
but on the reconstruction of society. The law of nations is also
the proper context in which to discuss those institutions and
habits in any society that either are unworkable or impede the
achievement of any proper human good.' 6
The problems of Third World development, for example,
are largely problems ofjus gentium; that is, they are problems of
common reason about what institutions and attitudes will and
will not work for a common good, even of another society.
Similarly, it is thejus gentium, and not "human rights," that is
the proper context in which to discuss the impediments to reli-
gious freedom in those rather too many states that directly im-
pede religious practice and conversion. "Human rights" are,
in fact, when not most carefully used, notions that can under-
mine any state or any morality.' 7 It is thejus gentium that forms
the proper context for discussing the problems of public and
private property that have so disordered the socialist states in
modern times.
Jus gentium is the philosophic discussion of those things to
be learned by reason and experience that are not merely
unique to each particular polity. It presupposes the first prin-
ciple of practical reason that all hold in common, and on this
basis it can claim, by right, to engage in the discussion of the
common foundations of morality and law. It recognizes that
crucial questions of public life and order will need clarity and
discussion, but it also recognizes that no polity or individual is
16. I have argued that mankind knows most of the basic ways to create and dis-
tribute wealth, but that habits of work or status or religion, along with defective eco-
nomic and political theories, are what prevents a more reasonable and abundant
world. In a broad sense, these too are question of the law of nations. See JAMES V.
SCHALL, RELIGION, WEALTH, AND POVERTY (1990).
17. As I have argued elswehere,
[iun relation to Grotius and the sort of modern natural right which he
founded . .. a natural "law" presupposed to full comprehension by human
reason became in effect a natural "right" which itself yielded no theoretic
reason for being what it was, no "author" of its right. The autonomous
reason and factual nature were thus theoretically left open to be radically
altered so that the optimum configuration of nature would itself depend on
a political will which conceived itself capable of determining what man is.
James V. Schall, S.J., Human Rights as an Ideological Project, AM. J. JURIS. 32 (1987); see
MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); HENRY VEATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? (1985); D'ENTR9VES, supra note 2, at 51-64.
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outside of the realm of common discourse. It is not, in this
sense, an "alienation" to take cognizance of political aberra-
tions wherever they might exist.
This is to say, following the example of St. Thomas, that
an accurate knowledge of an evil or an error, either of thought
or of practice, is itself a question of integrity and a function of
rational discourse. This consideration, at this point, is not a
claim to international law jurisdiction in certain cases like
crime or genocide or to "interference" in the internal affairs of
an erring country. These latter actions may indeed follow if
the evidence is established. But here there is a prior intelligi-
ble claim that common principles exist and that logical conclu-
sions follow from them. Thus, they cannot be ignored intellec-
tually and politically if human beings are to retain moral and
philosophical integrity.
Yves Simon wrote in his book, The Tradition of Natural
Law,'" that the law of nations was never fully clarified in the
Roman law itself. Roman law looked on man as simply a be-
ing, an animal, or a rational agent. Roman lawyers would
sometimes use natural law to refer to man as being or as
animal, while they would use the "law of nations" to refer to
man as a rational being, to his unique distinction as man.' 9
However, if natural law includes all three categories in Roman
law, what then would "the law of nations" possibly mean? Si-
mon pointed out that in modern times, the "law of nations"
has come to mean mainly a law, mostly customary or treaty
law, that guided relations among independent nations.
To understand properly the law of nations, it is necessary
to have some reference to principles intelligible to and under-
stood by civilized societies that recognize the validity of univer-
sal and binding discourse. The common law of civilized socie-
ties, the law of nations, came to be identified with international
law for this reason. As long as no organized institutional com-
munity of nations exists, the only law which can hold is one
with which a number of independent communities happen to
agree.20 Contrary to certain modern and positivist concep-
18. YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAw: A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLEC-
TIONS 152 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1965).
19. St. Thomas spoke of this in his COMMENTARY ON THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE,
1019.
20. SIMON, supra note 18, at 152-53. Francisco de Vitoria was the first to define
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tions of international law, which root its obligatory character in
the consent or recognition of sovereign states, 2' or various
rearticulations of the categorical imperative,2 2 such agreement
has the force of law because it bears the marks of rational argu-
ment of principles to conclusions."
Yves Simon continued his observation by pointing out the
relationship of the natural law to the law of nations. From the
point of view of rational analysis, natural law and the law of
nations do not differ. Both manifest reason. No society of
human beings exists in which first principles are somehow not
the same or intelligible. What is the status of reasonable
precepts that are argued from recognized first principles but
are not immediately "self-evident"? Contingent circumstances
modem international law with his purposeful modification in De Indiis of Ulpian's
formulation: "quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit." For a general discussion
of the philosophical and theological origins of the law of nations, seeJos6 Manuel de
Aguilar, O.P., The Law of Nations and the Salamanca School of Theology, 9 THOMIST 187,
216 (1946). As Fr. de Aguilar observes, however, we must be careful not to confuse
or identify the law of nations with international law. In Vitoria's thinking, the law of
nations is anterior and superior to international law because it relates to the common
principles and institutions among different peoples, whereas international law only
arises among men after the "social fraction" into particular political states. Id. at
217. Vitoria's contribution to international law is to have solidly anchored it in the
Thomistic framework ofjus gentium, one that unites national states into a non-contrac-
tual but organic community closely informed by natural law.
21. Professor Thomas Franck, for example, grounds his proceduralist explanation
of the legal character of international law in the literary structure, origin, internal
consistency and reasonableness of the rules themselves. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. Irr'L L. 705, 706-13 (1988) (suggesting
that "rule legitimacy" or "right process" in formulation and recognition of interna-
tional law explains compliance by states in absence of hierarchical world order or
coercion).
22. See, e.g., Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 74-93 (1992) (advocating Kantian basis for international human
rights and democratic government as alternative to conventional orientation of inter-
national law based on primacy of state sovereignty); cf. Fernando R. Tes6n, Interna-
tional Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 109-18
(1990) (grounding, on basis of modified Rawlsian model, thesis that traditional no-
tion of primacy of state sovereignty in international law must be redefined to accord
primacy to respect for persons).
23. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted that the most significant and lasting contribu-
tion ofJames Brierly to international law was his opposition to its increasingly posi-
tivist and consensual orientation: "Uames Brierly] had no hesitation in pointing to
the beneficent potentialities of a revived law of nature as one of the main elements of
the moral foundation of international law-for, upon final analysis, he saw no other
basis for it." Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Brierly's Contribution to International Law, in THE
BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY THE LATE JAMES
LESLIE BRIERLY at xv (H. Lauterpacht & C.H.M. Waldock eds.)
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may well appear in questions arising under the law of nations.
Simon maintained that
[iun fact, the contingent conditions that are commonly real-
ized in developed societies, constitute an entire and com-
plex system. Vague as these terms may be, they help us per-
ceive the normal source of international law. Its rules are
deductions from natural law which indeed involve contin-
gent conditions, but these contingent conditions are com-
monly realized when societies are sufficiently developed. 4
The contingent variety in practice and expression does not de-
tract from the fact that the same essential principles and issues
presented to reason are at work in every polity. The variety of
human practices and laws even on important things does not in
principle mean that reason is not at work to deduce the neces-
sity of a law from a self-evident principle.
In 1954, Walter Lippmann wrote a then famous, and still
worthy, book entitled The Public Philosophy, a book written in
large part to analyze the philosophic origins and lessons of
World War 11.25 Interestingly in retrospect, the first section of
this book was entitled, "The Decline of the West." This
moody title was immediately drawn from the famous work of
Oswald Spengler philosophizing about the end of World War
I, a book itself reflective of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Ro-
man Empire. In turn, one cannot read this famous book without
recalling St. Augustine's City of God. The City of God itself was
written against the practical background of accusations that the
Christian religion was the cause of Roman decline, as well as
against the theoretical background of Plato's Republic, a book
that considered the location of the best regime. All of these
books bear universal philosophic import.
Mr. Lippmann himself argued that some error or choice of
a vast and profound nature was at the heart of modern political
aberrations. A long tradition of reason, reasoned discourse,
and religious virtue had been rejected, to be replaced by a tra-
dition, beginning with Machiavelli, that had overturned that
wisdom in which Western civilization had been grounded. The
precise understanding of "modernity" in political philosophy
became the essential intellectual question for subsequent legal
24. SIMON, supra note 18, at 153.
25. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955).
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and political theory.26
"As the bitter end has become visible in the countries of
the total revolution," Mr. Lippmann wrote,
we can see how desperate is the predicament of modem
men. The terrible events show that the harder they try to
make earth into heaven, the more they make it a hell. Yet,
the yearning for salvation and for perfection is most surely
not evil, and it is, moreover, perennial in the human soul.
Are men then doomed by the very nature of things to be
denied the highest good if it cannot be materialized in this
world and if, as so large a number of modem men assume,
it will not be materialized in another world?... If there is a
way out of the modem predicament, it begins, I believe,
where we learn to recognize the difference between the two
realms. For the radical error of the modern democratic
gospel is that it promises, not the good of this world, but
the perfect life of heaven. The root of the error is the con-
fusion of the two realms-that of this world where the
human condition is to be born, to live, to work, to struggle
and to die, and that of the transcendent world in which
men's souls can be regenerate and at peace. The confusion
of these two realms is an ultimate disorder.27
What is of note, in retrospect, in these remarks of Mr. Lipp-
mann is that he associated "ultimate disorder" and "radical er-
ror" not so much with totalitarian regimes, which were only
consistent conclusions from erroneous philosophy, but pri-
marily with "the modern democratic gospel," as if the root
problem was one of political philosophy and classic theology
and not just of law and civic institutions. Plato's classic teach-
ing, that disorders of polity are themselves reflective of disor-
26. As Leo Strauss observed,
The crisis of modernity reveals itself in the fact, or consists in the fact, that
modern western man no longer knows what he wants- that he no longer
believes that he can know what is good and bad, what is right and wrong.
Until a few generations ago, it was generally taken for granted that man can
know what is right and wrong, what is the just or the good or the best order
of society- in a word that political philosophy is possible and necessary. In
our time this faith has lost its power. According to the predominant view,
political philosophy is impossible: it was a dream, perhaps, a noble dream,
but at any rate a dream.
LEO STRAUSS, The Three Waves of Modernity, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: Six ESSAYS BY
LEO STRAUSS 81 (Hilail Gildin ed., 1975).
27. LIPPMANN, supra note 25, at 109-10.
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ders of soul, remains an initial starting point in fundamental
political philosophy.
Did the "countries of total revolution," in other words, in-
clude somehow the other countries of the West besides the to-
talitarian ones visible in the 1940s? In a related manner and
about the same time, Leo Strauss made the same fundamental
point about philosophic disorder in his discussion of the
"modem project," while Eric Voegelin reemphasized it under
his discussion of "gnosticism. '2  The controversy over the
American Founding itself is involved in the proper under-
standing of its relation to modernity and to the transcendent
origins of law and being.
Probably no one has stated this divergence in Western
thought better than Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his famous
Harvard address of 1978:
The mistake must be at the root, at the very foundation of
thought in modern time. I refer to the prevailing Western
view of the world which was born in the Renaissance and
has found political expression since the Age of Enlighten-
ment. It became the basis for political and social doctrine
and could be called rationalistic humanism or humanistic
autonomy: the proclaimed and practical autonomy of man
from any higher force above him .... The humanistic way
of thinking, which has proclaimed itself our guide, did not
admit the existence of intrinsic evil in man, nor did it see
any task higher than the achievement of happiness on
earth.29
In 1991, Mr. Solzhenitsyn added that a society's strength or
weakness depends "more on the level of its spiritual life than
on its level of industrialization .... If a nation's spiritual ener-
gies have been exhausted, it will not be saved from collapse by
the most perfect government or by any industrial develop-
ment. . .. ,,so Solzhenitsyn and Pope John Paul II have both
recognized that the Marxist collapse was more one of spirit
28. See generally LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN (1964); LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL
RIGHT AND HISTORY (1952); ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1953);
ERIC VOEGELIN, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND GNOSTICISM (1968). See JAMES V. SCHALL,
THE POLITICS OF HEAVEN AND HELL: CHRISTIAN THEMES FROM CLASSICAL, MEDIEVAL,
AND MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1984).
29. SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD 16 (Ronald Berman ed., 1980).
30. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Our Own Democracy, NAT'L REV., Sept. 1991, at 44.
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than of economics or even of polity.3 1
In what sense was America a "best regime"? Did demo-
cratic principle obviate moral collapse? What was the relation
of these questions to natural, constitutional, and positive law?
The American principle, Ellis Sandoz has written, is
that the pursuit of happiness and highest liberty as the goal
of human existence primarily will be conducted privately
under the protection of the Constitution. While that solu-
tion to the vexed problems of religion and politics is ambig-
uous and even paradoxical in a society formed by Christian
civilization, it is theoretically acute and pragmatically
sound.... For Americans, [the] rearticulation of Western
civilization in the founding reasserted the classic and Chris-
tian experiences-symbols of transcendent reality in a way
that runs directly counter to radical modernity by providing
an ennobling alternative to it.3 2
The question that Walter Lippmann and Alexander Solzhenit-
syn pose is not, then, whether the American tradition is in con-
formity with classical and Christian traditions, but whether in
recent times another legal and philosophic theory, which ren-
ders limited government and transcendent freedom impossi-
ble, has subverted its origins, along with Western civil life it-
self.
With the demise of the Marxist experiment, whose inspira-
tion itself was surely based on an attempt to establish a kind of
Kingdom of God on earth, it is again possible to ask properly
questions of natural law and the law of nations. This time
these questions can be asked in a less utopian context than that
in which they had been posed in modern times. No doubt, we
must continue to wonder, as Paul Johnson has pointed out,
31. Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus ofJohn Paul II on the Hundredth Anniver-
sary of Rerum Novarum, 22-29 [hereinafter Centesimus Annus]. John Paul II writes in
Centesimus Annus that
the true cause of the new developments [of the year 1989] was the spiritual void
brought about by atheism, which deprived the younger generations of a
sense of direction and in many cases lead them, in the irrepressible search
for personal dignity and for the meaning of life, to rediscover the religious
roots of their national cultures, and to rediscover the person of Christ him-
self as the existentially adequate response to the desire in every human
heart for goodness, truth and life.
Id. 24 (emphasis added).
32. ELLIS SANDOZ, A GOVERNMENT OF LAws 216-17 (1991).
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whether the root problem does not remain with us in our souls
and minds, and whether its essence has been merely trans-
ferred to other and more recent enthusiasms like environ-
mentalism, or feminism, or statism.3" These enthusiasms have
not rejected the root error that postulates that man's freedom
consists in "making himself," a making presupposed to no na-
ture or order not dependent on man's own will.
Thus, according to this view, it is still possible to produce
"a perfect society," and, by implication, still possible literally
to "remake" man. It is just that Marxism was the wrong way to
do it. Now, it is said, let us begin another way, perhaps with a
more "perfect" Marxism, or other sort of utopianism, one with
a more comprehensive "science." We must recall that the
original proposal for "a perfect society" was in the greatest
philosophical book in our tradition, Plato's Republic. In this
book we were subtly and charmingly warned of the dangers
inherent in this effort. And if we did not catch these warnings
in Plato's works, they were more clearly narrated in the books
of his pupil, Aristotle.
No doubt, one of the initial problems today, a problem
that is increasingly dominant in all of academia, is a cultural
relativism that maintains, in effect, that there is really nothing
to learn.3 4 Everything is true or not true, as the case may be,
because there is no ontological criterion. 35 No test of excel-
lence or rightness can exist, in principle. Cultural and intellec-
tual relativism at bottom suggest that the real enemy is the phi-
losophy that argues that there is some stable human nature,
some area of philosophy in which the "relative" itself is tested.
Modern academia and intelligence almost always hear this
sort of criticism in purely political terms. Truth is seen to be a
threat to freedom, not its end and purpose. 6 The result is that
the highest things, the things that most matter to men, are ex-
cluded from serious discourse. This exclusion is made by
states already built on theocracy or ideology. These states do
33. Paul Johnson, Is Totalitarianism Dead? CRIsIs, Feb. 1989, at 9-17.
34. See HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND JUSTICE 134-59 (1986).
35. See generally JOSEF PIEPER, LIVING THE TRUTH: THE TRUTH OF ALL THINGS
and JOSEF PIEPER, REALITY AND THE GOOD (1989).
36. See YVES R. SIMON, Freedom of the Intellect and Truth and Community, in A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY 100-32 (1980).
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not want to listen to Socrates; that is, they do not want to listen
to any truth outside of themselves, because they understand
the tenuousness of their own founding. Other more liberal
states consider discussions of the highest things to be danger-
ous to institutions based on democratic relativism, itself essen-
tially a civil or secular religion, as Irving Kristol has recently
pointed out.3
7
II. IS WORLD ORDER POSSIBLE WITHOUT REFERENCE
TO COMMON PRINCIPLES?
Many students of modern legal history have heard of the
Hague Conventions, the League of Nations, and the United
Nations. They are familiar with the names of Gabriel Vizquez,
Francisco Suirez, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and other
early modern theorists who wrote of the law of nations or in-
ternational law at the beginnings of the nation-state in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries.3 8 Many jurists are likewise
familiar with the international role that the Papacy and the
Holy Roman Emperor had played up until the time of the rise
of the nation-states, whose construction was based precisely on
a denial of any sovereignty higher than that of the modern pol-
ity itself.
Indeed, as Harold Berman has pointed out, most of the
institutions and procedures used by the modern state were ac-
tually first hammered out in the dicasteries of the Papacy con-
cerning canon and civil law.39 Good students will also be fa-
miliar with the formation and codification of Roman law, with
the Stoics and with the Corpus Juris Civilis; they will also know
the relationships and differences between Roman law and com-
mon law.40 Behind this legal background, they will also know
about the passage in the Gospel of Matthew in which the Apos-
tles are told to go and leach all nations.4 ' They may know that
37. Irving Kristol, The Future of AmericanJewery, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1991, at 92.
38. See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
(1947).
39. HAROLD S. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WEST-
ERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
40. See ARTHUR B. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 21-22 (1985); HANS
JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 197-98 (1978).
41. Matthew 28: 19-20.
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the first part of the Hebrew Bible is devoted to "The Law."4 2
Finally, perhaps, they will know why Aristotle was not es-
pecially enthusiastic about Alexander the Great's notion of
universal empire and brotherhood. Aristotle thought that it
would be impossible to organize vast empires of men into one
political whole. In fact, it would be dangerous to do so, for it
would end in jeopardizing the possibility of the highest things
existing in any place at all.4 3 The multiplicity of smaller states
was in practice more likely to allow at least some reasonably
good polities. The randomness of the vast empires almost al-
ways insured a kind of tyranny.44
In the beginning of modernity, especially in the early sev-
enteenth century, the question was posed: Granted the exist-
ence of so many diverse nations, themselves breaking away
from the older religions and empires, what remains common?
Writers like Spengler, Toynbee, Voegelin, and others spoke
rather of civilizations and cultures than of nations as the basis
of communality and diversity. 45 With the advent of the mod-
ern age, unity and diversity were located, it seemed, in the cul-
ture, not in the individual or the nation.
Thus, the Islamic states were not seen as particularly inter-
esting in themselves, but as slightly differing expressions of a
common faith. The debate about the meaning of human exist-
ence, nevertheless, had to exist at a level deeper than that of
the nation-state. The Chinese seemed to claim that they did
not need to debate with anyone, even after they had adopted a
42. See generally HERMANN KLEINKNECHT & W. GUTBROD, LAw (1962).
43. The multiplicity of states at least allowed the possibility of some society of
relative virtue, whereas an international order was so complex and dangerous that it
could in all likelihood result only on tyranny on a vast scale. See LEO STRAUSS, THE
CITY AND MAN, supra note 28, at 13-49. The thesis that Strauss is arguing against is
that, among others, of W.W. TARN, HELLENISTIC CIVILISATION (1974).
44. As Charles McCoy observed,
[t]he reason why Aristotle did not consider a larger unit than the city-state
as politically viable lies in the fact that any larger unit in the fifth century
Mediterranean world would not have met the exigencies of a truly "polit-
ical" life but rather would have favored a kind of random freedom befitting
not men but animals and slaves .... Was it not Aristotle's opinion that in
the milieu of empire men would live at random on the margin of society,
contributing little or nothing to the common good, all readily victimized by
the common slavery to which the whole of human nature is subject?
CHARLES N.R. McCoy, THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 75-76 (1963).
45. The latest addition to this discussion is probably Francis Fukuyama's THE
END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1991).
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Marxist form. Western civilization was also something one
could study, define, largely because of the Greeks, Romans,
the Bible, the Church, and science.46 The Japanese became
particularly interesting because they seemed to combine, con-
trary to all expectations, an ancient culture, a single nation,
with modem political institutions, and especially modern sci-
ence and technology.
The final break-up of the European empires after World
War II and the establishment of the United Nations seemed at
first sight to be in the name of universal democratic and scien-
tific principles. In a sense, it was a victory for universal civiliza-
tion, even though this very idea of universal civilization was
itself a Western idea.47 The recent collapse of the Marxist ex-
periment, itself likewise based largely in Western universalism,
in an effort to organize the whole world into a single classless
society, in its demise also seems to argue to common principles
of free trade, private enterprise, democracy, and popular sov-
ereignty. These latter principles, as we shall see, seemed
rather close to the issues that Thomas Aquinas stressed about
the law of nations.
And yet, there are increasing signs, of which cultural rela-
tivism is the theoretic expression, that what is at stake is the
very notion of a common humanity, of common principles of
justice and right, of anything that can transcend the power of
culture or the nation-state or its sovereign individuals. None-
theless, even the theory of relativism, of the consequent justifi-
cation of absolute national power, is rooted in the West's phil-
osophic discussion with itself, a discussion intended to be uni-
versally true. Machiavelli himself, the founder of modernity, of
46. See CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE
(1977); CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE MAKING OF EUROPE (1965).
47. The current problem, popularly known as "politically correct thinking," it-
self based on a philosophy of deconstructionism, is but the logical consequence of
doubt about universal principles. Leo Strauss had it right:
The crisis of the West consists in the West's having become uncertain of its
purpose. The West was once certain of its purpose -of a purpose in which
all men could be united, and hence it had a clear vision of its future as the
future of mankind. We no longer have that certainty and that clarity.... A
society which was accustomed to understand itself in terms of a universal
purpose, cannot lose faith in that purpose without becoming completely be-
wildered.
STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN, supra note 28, at 3.
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a system that rejects classical reason, in dedicating his book to
Lorenzo the Magnificent was addressing what he considered to
be human nature as such, how it always and everywhere would
act.48
In this sense, our political and economic institutions re-
quire some justification that they cannot provide simply by
their own constitution or legislation. Practical matters have
their place, no doubt, even their theory, as Aristotle and Burke
would have suggested. Nevertheless, to defend even the most
practical and common things, as G. K. Chesterton wrote in his
book on St. Thomas Aquinas, we must ultimately resort to the
first and most philosophical of enterprises.4 0
The term, "the law of nations," as we have indicated, has a
long history. 50 What is perhaps useful here, I think, is to elab-
orate more clearly the philosophic understanding of this no-
tion. This effort is particularly necessary within the context of
the theoretical political and legal relativism that surrounds
many of our contemporary discussions about the purpose and
shape of our "new world order." This relativism was already
noted by Aristotle in his discussion of the Greek understand-
48. As Machiavelli wrote in his dedication:
Since it is my intention to write a useful thing for him who understands, it
seemed to me more profitable to go behind the effectual truth of the thing,
than the imagination thereof. And many have imagined republics and
principates that have never been seen or known to be in truth; because there
is such a distance between how one lives and how one should live that he
who lets go that which is done for that which ought to be done learns his
ruin rather than his preservation-for a man who wishes to profess the good
in everything needs must fall among so many who are not good. Hence, it is
necessary for a prince, if he wishes to maintain himself, to learn to be able to
be not good, and to use it and not to use it according to necessity.
NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 93 (Leo Paul de Alvarez trans., 1980); seeJacques
Maritain, The End of Machiavellianism, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
JACQUES MARITAIN 295-325 (Joseph W. Evans & Leo R. Ward eds., 1976).
49. As G.K. Chesterton put it,
But St. Thomas had the scientific humility in this very vivid and special
sense; that he was ready to take the lowest place; for the examination of the
lowest things. He did not, like a modern specialist, study the worm as if it
were the world; but he was willing to begin to study the reality of the world
in the reality of the worm. His Aristotelianism simply meant that the study
of the humblest fact will lead to the study of the highest truth.
G. K. CHESTERTON, St. Thomas Aquinas in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF G. K. CHESTERTON
470.
50. See A.J. & R. W. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE
WEST 33-44, 71-80 (1930).
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ing of democracy as a regime in which liberty ruled.5 ' This
"liberty" was one under which, as Socrates recounted about
Athens, no one could distinguish between a fool and a wise
man because there was no criterion of distinction.
This liberty postulated a doctrine of freedom based on a
denial of defensible philosophic roots or first principles intelli-
gible to all men, even if all men might not understand them or,
more likely, if they refuse to understand them. In this context,
not unlike our own, to speak of "the law of nations" is an ef-
fort, not new, to ask what is fundamentally common and what
is legitimately different among the nations. More recently, we
have taken to use "cultural relativism" and not "national diver-
sity" because it is recognized that the nation-state is not always
or even primarily at the bottom of this diversity.
The classical tradition had based itself on the reflection
that the primary division among men was not geographical, ra-
cial, or biological. In The Apology, almost as though he foresaw
Hobbes, in a passage that fundamentally defines the nature of
Western culture, Socrates stated:
I did not think I ought to do anything servile because of my
danger; and now I do not regret that such was the manner
of my defense; I much prefer to die after such a defense
than to live by the other sort. Neither in court nor in war
ought I or anyone else to do anything and everything to
contrive an escape from death. In battle it is often clear that
a man might escape by throwing away his arms and by beg-
ging mercy from his pursuers; and there are many other
means in every danger, for escaping death, if a man can
bring himself to do and say anything and everything. No,
gentlemen, the difficult thing is not to escape death, I think,
but to escape wickedness-that is much more difficult, for
that runs faster than death.52
51. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1317a40-1317b5 in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., Random House 1941). Aristotle explained that
[t]he basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common
opinion of man, can only be enjoyed in such a state:-this they affirm to be
the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule
and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of
numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority
must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end
and the just.
Id.
52. PLATO, THE APOLOGY, 38-39.
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And Aristotle remarked that the subject matter of ethics is the
things worthy of praise and blame. The most fundamental dis-
tinction of men and regimes was based on the distinction be-
tween good and evil.
Yet, while the law of nations may or may not argue to a
common political or legal authority capable of arbitrating wars
and disputes, the need, if not the possibility, of such authority
is widely recognized. But any authority is itself rooted in intel-
ligence, in some notion of its own legitimacy. 53 And this legiti-
macy must be somehow based in reason. The law of nations or
thejus gentium, as we have indicated, was designed to account
for the common things that were found in the jurisdiction of all
civil societies. Each civil society had positive laws unique to
itself, but certain laws dealing with murder, theft, perjury, and
such actions, as well as with buyings and sellings, were found
wherever there were men in civil society. This common strata
was not accidental but a conclusion of general, practical reason
about the essential structure or requirements of actual human
nature so recognized wherever men lived with one another.
Moreover, the law of nations itself was a necessary deriva-
tive from natural law. It was based on the principle that human
beings throughout time and space were the same in their es-
sential structure, in that they each possessed reason, and that
reason could be formulated, communicated, understood, and
debated wherever men sought understanding. The theories
and actions of anyone, even rulers, could and should be tested
by reason. This testing would result in an agreed upon law if
the reasonable solution could be found. It would result in vio-
lence, disagreement, and even war if it could not.
But law and war were themselves efforts to guarantee that
reason prevailed. The "law of war" was not a contradiction in
terms, but an effort to limit and define the issues of reason and
unreason at stake in a given controversy. Law and war needed
explication, even if it were, as Plato understood, only the the-
ory that "the law of the strongest" rules by right. War was not
simply war, but "just war," as Aquinas taught.54 It did not es-
cape the scrutiny of reason, even when it was barbarous and
the barbarians won. And when the barbarians lost, the winners
53. See SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AuTHORITY, supra note 36, at 23-79.
54. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, 1I-I, question 40.
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did not necessarily become barbarians. It depended on what
they did. That is, it depended on reason.
St. Thomas, in question 95 of the prima-secundae of the
Summa Theologica, treated the specific question of the meaning
of "human law."' 55 By human law, Aquinas meant laws "pos-
ited" by a legitimate civil society through its own proper chan-
nels, with a proper end and knowledge of what it does. Article
4 of this same question asks about a remark of St. Isidore of
Seville, an early collector of philosophic and religious docu-
ments. 6 St. Isidore, evidently, had distinguished jus gentium
and civil or posited law.57 The question arose about whether
there was any root difference betweenjus gentium and ordinary
constitutional and civil laws. St. Thomas held that there was a
difference, one that went back to his earlier discussion in arti-
cle 2 about whether all humanly posited laws are derived from
the natural law.58
55. Id. I-I, question 95.
56. In this article, St. Thomas observed that
[i]t would seem that Isidore divided human statutes or human law wrongly.
For under this law he includes the law of nations, so called, because, as he
says, nearly all nations use it. But, as he says, natural law is that which is common
to all nations. Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Id. question 95, art. 4.
57. In his Etymologies, St. Isidore had abandoned Ulpian's classical definition of
the natural law, quod natura omnia animalia docuit, or, commune omnium, eo quod utique
instinctu naturae, non constitutine habetur aliqua, and insisted on its origin and universal-
ity: .'It is common to all nations, since it is given everywhere by natural instinct and
not by any establishment." Isidore imprecisely defined the law of nations as quod eo
iure omnesfere gentes utuntur, or "the law which almost all nations use." These defini-
tions tended to confuse natural law and the law of nations, as distinguished from
human or positive law. See de Aguilar, supra note 20, at 192-93.
58. In article 4, Aquinas sought to reconcile his view that the law of nations is
included within positive law with the authority of Isidore. He referred to his earlier
argument in article 2 that every human law is derived from the law of nature, and,
according to the two ways that something may be derived from natural law, he di-
vided positive law into civil law and the law of nations. The law of nations is thus
included within positive law. St. Thomas resolved the apparent contradiction with
Isidore by invoking the Roman concept ofjus naturale that Isidore had abandoned.
See de Aguilar, supra note 20, at 192-94. As Fr. de Aguilar observed,
[f]rom Roman Law [Aquinas] took his distinction and at the same time the
tendency to link the law of nations more closely with the natural law. The
law of nations is common to all men, imposed by the necessities of the same
human nature, founded on the natural reason itself and exclusive to the ra-
tional nature.
Id. at 195.
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Of primary importance here, of course, is whether, as in
Roman law, it is sufficient to find out merely whether the law is
"posited" by the will of the ruler to be worthy of obedience by
rational subjects. 59 Aquinas held that all law did require some
effort to see its justification. We are to obey all laws after the
manner any human being ought to do anything, that is, with an
understanding of what one does when doing it and why what a
person does is legitimate. Without these latter two elements,
the observance of the law is not fully "rational" or understood
by the doer.
St. Thomas explained that this justification might be diffi-
cult at times to see, but that it would take one of two forms.
Either it would be merely a deduction from principles that are
already quite clear and readily accepted, or it would be decided
after the manner of determining something that had to be de-
cided in particular. Thus, in the first case, if we should not
harm our neighbor in general, a law that we should not murder
him would be clear as a reasonable deduction from the prem-
ise that we should not harm him.
We can even ask at an earlier stage why we should not
harm him at all. The answer to this would have to do with the
kind of being he is, whether he is acting dangerously or threat-
eningly to us or someone else, and with our own limited nature
and our realization that we are like unto other human beings in
their essential nature. This is an argument made perhaps most
famously by Cicero in his De Officiis as well as by St. Thomas in
the treatise on law of the Summa.6°
59. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-I, question 90, art. 1. St. Thomas an-
swered the possible objection that law pertains, not to reason, but to the will. Con-
trary to the Roman maxim that "[w]hatsoever pleaseth the sovereign has the force of
law," St. Thomas wrote that
[r]eason has its power of moving from the will, as was stated above; for it is
due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as
regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is
commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some
rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will
of the sovereign has the force of law; or otherwise the sovereign's will would
savor of lawlessness rather than of law.
Id. (citation omitted).
60. As Cicero wrote,
To take something away from someone else-to profit by another's loss-is
more unnatural than death, or destitution, or pain, or any other physical or
external blow. To begin with, this strikes at the roots of human society and
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Secondly, Aquinas pointed out that we must decide some
things because many alternatives are available to us. We must
"determine" which one we will use. Thus if we are to build a
house, we cannot just build an abstract form of a house, but we
must determine that we will build this specific house, not that
one-a Georgian Mansion, not a Cape Cod cottage. The other
example St. Thomas often used was, significantly, that of de-
termining punishment. It may be reasonable that we punish,
but it is a question of choice and prudence how we carry this
reason out in our particular legal system.
A. The Thomistic Account of the Jus Gentium
What has this discussion of human law to do withjus gen-
tium? Aquinas said, in discussing St. Isidore, that there are
many things within human law that can be intelligently divided
or distinguished. 6' The first thing is that the human law is de-
rived from natural law. In this sense, he continues, positive
right, orjus positivum, can be divided into civil law ("us) andjus
gentium.
Unumquodquae potest per se dividi secundum id quod in eius ratione
continetur. . . . Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae,
secundum quorum quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi po-
test; est enim primo de ratione legis humanae quod sit derivata a lege
naturae.... Et secundum hoc dividitur jus positivum in jus gen-
tium et jus civile secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur a
lege naturae.62
The difference between civil law and thejus gentium lies in how
each is derived from natural law. By what processes of intelli-
gence are the law of nations and civil law derived from natural
fellowship. For if we each of us propose to rob or injure one another for our
personal gain, then we are clearly going to demolish what is more emphati-
cally nature's creation than anything else in the whole world: namely, the
link that unites every human being with every other.
CICERO, De Officiis, in SELECTED WORKS 166 (Michael Grant ed., 1977).
61. THoMAs AquINAS, supra note 1, I-I, question 95, art. 4.
62. Id. ("A thing can be divided essentially in respect of something contained in
the notion of that thing .... Now, in the notion of human law, many things are
contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and essen-
tially. For, in the first place, it belongs to the notion of human law to be derived from
the law of nature .... In this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations and
civil law, according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law
of nature.").
1991-1992] NATURAL LA WAND LAW OF NATIONS
law, which itself essentially means, "doing what is reason-
able?"
The jus gentium is derived after the first manner, that is,
after the manner of necessary principles from more clear
premises.63 What St. Thomas puts in this category would not
merely be that murder is wrong and to be punished, but things
like just buying and selling, namely those things "sine quibus
homines ad invicem convivere non possunt."I Aquinas adds that
human beings cannot live without these things because, citing
Aristotle, man is a "social animal." However, those things that
derive merely from determinations of a natural principle, like
punishments, belong purely to civil law and can vary widely-
"quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommode determinat."65 But each
particular civil law of this kind has within it, so to speak, the
argumentation of thejus gentium about human deeds and pun-
ishments and how they are logically related.66
If we ask what is the significance of this discussion about
the difference in how jus gentium and jus civile are "derived"
from the natural law, it becomes clear that St. Thomas is saying
that certain particular reasons are binding beyond our civil
boundaries. We are obliged by them even if we are not citizens
of the other polity. One can ask the question, for example, "In
Los Angeles would it be all right for an Englishman to drive on
the left hand side of the road because that is the way they do it
in England?" The answer is clearly in the negative not merely
because of California civil law, but because that civil law in
such a case contains the law of nations principle as it relates to
the natural law principle of acting reasonably.
In spite of the fact that the jurisdiction the Englishman is
visiting clearly might be a tyranny, he must, by virtue of the law
of nations, still obey the laws of the local polity, even if in his
own polity driving on the left-hand side of the road is a legiti-
mate habit. Was he free, therefore, because "lex tyrannica non
63. Id. As noted earlier, St. Thomas stated that "[t]he law of nations is indeed,
in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is de-
rived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its
principles." Id. In order to reconcile Isidore's account, which had included thejus
gentium within human law, St. Thomas then distinguished jus gentium and its rational
character from that law of nature that man shares with all animals. Id.
64. Id. ("Things without which men are not able to live together.")
65. Id. ("Each city determines what is proper to itself.")
66. Id.
1021
1022 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:997
est leX?.' 67 It is obvious that he remains bound by the natural
law and the law of nations to what is reasonable. While he
might be justified in killing the tyrant, he is not free to kill any-
one by the way he drives his car, even in a tyranny. Thus, the
local laws of driving bind him by virtue of the law of nations.
What binds the Englishman in this case in principle then
seems to bejus gentium, the notion that reasonable ways of act-
ing are clear to anyone who sets his mind to it. Likewise, in
buying and selling, surely the very stuff of international trade,
reasonable norms of exchange and value need to be set up to
measure justice in these cases. Coinage and weights may be
different, but jus gentium would suggest that some reasonable
equivalence is possible and needs to be deduced from the prin-
ciple of man's social nature as it exists in particular relation-
ships.
In order to appreciate the far-reaching effects of the natu-
ral law/law of nations distinction, I want to turn to the discus-
sion by Charles N. R. McCoy of this topic in his insightful
book, The Structure of Political Thought.6 8 Fr. McCoy was particu-
larly concerned to show howjus gentium had become, by a se-
ries of misunderstandings of its essence, a basis of modern to-
talitarian theory whether it be in the democratic Rousseauist
version or in the absolutist Marxist version.
Several historians of political thought, notably George
Sabine and the Carlyles, had, following certain Roman law in-
terpretations, understood the first principles of natural law to
be those that man had in common with the animals. This
meant that things like property and polity were added by the
jus gentium to natural law. In this sense, politics was not a sign
of human perfection, as Aristotle had held, but of its bondage
through reason. To be perfect meant not to be civil and polit-
ical, as Aristotle had held, but to escape from politics, as the
Stoics and Epicureans had held. It is from these latter sources
that anti-political notions enter into modern political philoso-
67. Id. question 92, art. 1.
68. McCoy, supra note 44, at 88-98; see also CHARLES N. R. McCoy, The Problem of
the Origin of Political Authority, in ON THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
ESSAYS OF CHARLES N. R. McCoy 49-60 (James V. Schall & John J. Schrems eds.,
1989); James V. Schall, "Man for Himself': On the Ironic Unities of Political Philosophy,
POL. Sci. REVIEWER, Fall 1985, at 67-108.
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phy. 69
Ultimately, this "escapist" position would justify the no-
tion that to be "human" meant to escape from the civilizing
institutions of family, state, and property.7 ° To be "natural"
did not mean to use one's reason to apply intelligence to more
particular things, which is the natural law of the being whose
reality includes this faculty. Rather it came to mean the desire
to escape from those institutions that had been added by rea-
son. Thus, perfection would be achieved by escaping from
family, polity, and property.
Aquinas, be it noted, had implied just the opposite, that is,
that human intelligence, in "adding to reason," became more
reasonable, civilized, and worthy. This addition was the pro-
ject intelligence gave to the naturally social being. It was to
establish a polity worthy of man himself, an establishment that
meant a constitution, with particular, but just laws, and a disci-
pline directed to virtue through the example of the law. But
this law included the freedom both to understand and act vir-
tuously from resources that are more than legal.
Fr. McCoy's discussion of this relation of natural law and
jus gentium is worth much reflection:
Natural law in its first precepts (as distinguished, then, from
69. See McCoy, supra note 44, at 73-87; see also James V. Schall, Post-Aristotelian
Philosophy and Political Theory, 3 CITHARA, Nov. 1963, at 56-79. As I have explained
elsewhere,
[w]ith the Epicureans and the Stoics, the idea began to germinate that ethics
and politics were superior to the confusions of the speculative order. Peace
was attained by a form of moderation and self-control, which had most pe-
culiar theoretical implications. These propositions held that man was not
affected by what went on in the cosmos, that there was no passage from the
practical to the speculative orders, no unity of the whole. Aristotle had held
that ethics and politics were the proper life of man, to be sure, but not his
highest or best life, so that the practical order was preparatory to contempla-
tion. He did not deny value or relative autonomy to the practical order. In
the post-Aristotelian philosophers, man himself became the theoretical
center .... The human order came to be transformable into metaphysics
itself. The effect of this reasoning is, again, to make politics into a kind of
metaphysics of a very odd sort.
JAMES V. SCHALL, REASON, REVELATION, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 64-65 (1987).
70. For a consideration of this same problem from its parallel origin in Genesis,
see SCHALL, THE POLITICS OF HEAVEN AND HELL, supra note 28, ch. 1 ("The Old Tes-
tament and Political Theory"); ch. 4 ("The Christian Guardians"); and ch. 7 ("The
Limits of Law") are also pertinent to this discussion.
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natural law in its secondary precepts [(94, a. 2)]-Jus Gen-
tium) embraces actions that are naturally known as bearing
an "absolute natural commensuration" with what nature in-
tends for men: for example, to seek good and avoid evil.
The matters belonging to Jus Gentium, on the other hand,
are said to bear a "relative natural commensuration" with
what nature intends for man. These are the civilizing insti-
tutions without which the principal ends of human life can-
not be attained except with the greatest difficulty.7 '
The "inclinations" or principal ends of human nature are to
life, to family, to know the truth about God, and to live in soci-
ety.71 What is said here is that these inclinations have the char-
acter not solely of deductions but of clearly known principles
or statements about what human nature is, as it is given from
nature.73
"Man does not make man to be man, but taking him from
nature, makes him to be good man," as Aristotle said. 74 Aqui-
nas adds in the next sentence in this same article the fact that
knowing the truth about God and the manner of living with
one another (convivere) belongs to this same law of reason, so
that we should "avoid ignorance and we ought not to offend
others in those things in which we ought to converse and deal
with them."' 75 I cite this passage at some length because Aqui-
nas in principle does not allow us not to use our reason and
when we use it, we are to use it rightly.
71. McCoy, supra note 44, at 95. In the Thomist tradition, Francisco de Vitoria
and Domingo de Soto, among the Salamanca theologians, emphasized the distinct
but intimate relation between the natural law and thejus gentium, including the impor-
tance of the latter for the conservation of the former. See de Aguilar, supra note 20, at
199. For Vitoria, the law of nations is not deduced with absolute necessity from the
natural law; its deduction is only "almost necessary" ("pene necessarium"), whence the
need that the law of nations receive the consent of men for its establishment. As Fr.
de Aguilar summarizes the relation of the three laws,
The law of nations is fixed in a medial, differential point between the two
laws. The natural law is absolutely necessary, an evident principle or a nec-
essary conclusion. The law of nations is hypothetically necessary, a conclu-
sion of the greatest fittingness. Positive law is hypothetical, by circumstan-
tial determination.
Id. at 201.
72, THOMAS AQuINAS, supra note 1, I-II, question 94, art. 2.
73. See James V. Schall, Truth and the Open Society, in ORDER, FREEDOM, AND PoL-
try 71-90 (George W. Carey ed., 1986).
74. Aristotle, THE POLITICS, 1256a21-22.
75. THoMsS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-I, question 94, art. 2.
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Charles McCoy pointed out that the jus gentium also be-
longs to reason in the sense that men can figure out and find
certain institutions and rules without which these main human
ends cannot be easily or rightly achieved. In other words, the
state's structure, rules of property, and a unified family life are
institutions that for the most part must exist if most people are
to achieve a full life of reason and virtue. When these rules do
not exist or do not exist as properly ordered, the empirical evi-
dence of the resulting disorder will be evident to careful rea-
son reflecting on the results.
Thus, as Fr. McCoy explained in considering the manner
in which unreasonable, though somehow attractive, institu-
tions are to be analyzed,
Possession of all things in common and the nonpolitical
condition greatly hinder the attainment of the principal end
of life .... The introduction, then, of civilizing institutions
is indeed natural in the sense that nature inclines thereto; it
is the work of man's natural reason. Far from embracing
principles of law that are corruptions of an original and
"higher law," the Jus Gentium, because it has the force of
natural law, is itself part of the "higher law," of which all the
different systems of civil law are mere particular determina-
76tions.
The proper content of civil law thus allows and encourages a
wide variety of political forms, constitutions, and legal arrange-
ments.77
Civil law then determines how particular things will be
done. But in essentials-whether there be a juridical system,
whether there be enforcement agencies, whether there be pri-
vate property and family-civil law remains subject to jus gen-
tium. That is, reason sees that such institutions are required for
the kind of beings we are if we are to reach our immediate and
highest ends. The highest ends of activity are not to be
achieved well without these intermediate considerations and
institutions. There is a discourse of reason that exists, and
must exist, "among the nations." The various cultures and
polities are not simply "diverse" and incommensurable. They
76. McCoy, supra note 44, at 95.
77. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, 1-11, question 95, art. 4.
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have common grounds of discourse about the what is of human
reality.
The import of this position in terms of political philoso-
phy and its relation to law is that civil rule as such is limited,
but necessary and good. Civil or positive human law is not the
giver of human nature. It does not establish what it is to be a
human being, nor is it the provider of the elements of that
human being's proper good and activity. All civil law has to
defend itself before the bar of reason at every level. The so-
called "sovereignty" of law ought not to mean that civil or con-
stitutional law is subject to nothing but itself or the wills of
those who constituted them.78 Those who constituted them
are in turn subject to what they are.79 This is their freedom and
their glory.
This "subjection," however, is itself the basis of any free-
dom we might have. For the fact that our being is given, and
not made by us, means that we can and must appeal to a rea-
son, a reason that we discover but do not make, for our judg-
ments about our actions and polities. The jus gentium in its
philosophic sense is what connects all political societies with
each other and what enables each member of any society to
consider rationally the validity of the rules he lives under and
the rightness of his own obedience to these laws. This obedi-
ence is not based on force or blind convention. Rather, it is
"promulgated" to our own reason so that we can understand
and test the "precepts," the statements of the law and our own
moral conscience which are themselves bound by what we did
not make.80
78. As Jacques Maritain observed, however,
in the political sphere, and with respect to the men or agencies in charge of
guiding peoples toward their earthly destinies, there is no valid use of the
concept of Sovereignty. Because, in the last analysis, no earthly power is the
image of God and deputy for God. God is the very source of the authority
with which the people invest those men or agencies, but they are not the
vicars of God. They are the vicars of the people; then they cannot be di-
vided from the people by any superior essential property.
MARITAIN, supra note 12, at 50.
79. James Brierly pointed to this most basic presupposition of legal reasoning
when he concluded, in his inquiry into the nature of the basis of obligation in interna-
tional law, that ultimately we must fall back on metaphysics. See Lauterpacht, supra
note 23, at 67.
80. See James V. Schall, Truth, Liberty, andLaw, in 1989 THE CATHOLIC COMMIS-
SION ON INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS 59-74; SIMON, supra note 36, at 143-56.
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In a famous sentence in his article on the "power" of law,
St. Thomas pointed out that "lex autem humana ponitur multi-
tudini hominum, in qua maior pars est hominum non perfectorum vir-
tute."' t That is, even though the law is concerned about justice
and reason, it can recognize that most people are imperfect.
This recognition would mean that we ought to estimate accu-
rately what can and cannot be done, lest something worse
come about. If something is too far in advance of possibility, a
more perfect norm will only discourage and be neglected. The
achievement of virtue or goodness in human affairs includes a
certain prudent appreciation of gradualness and of the agoniz-
ing confrontation with evil and evil habits. Aquinas did not by
this limitation mean to lessen or condone the power of evil
among men and institutions, but rather to make it more possi-
ble to confront it because of a more accurate estimation of the
difficulties in which men are involved in their very condition.
Consequently, in his answer to the second objection in the
same article, St. Thomas remarked, "lex humana intendit homines
inducere ad virtutem, non subito, sed gradatim."82 The law recog-
nizes that virtue must be seen to be a gradual process, not,
except rarely, a sudden one. Such principles of prudence and
good sense also will be operative in the civil law and the jus
gentium. But what is of interest here is not so much the gradu-
alness and common sense displayed by Aquinas in dealing with
actual men, but his insistence that natural law and reason re-
main the goals to which we ought to strive and the norms by
which we ought to judge what is imperfect and evil.
This is perhaps the moderate and legitimate approach to
the "political realism" we associate with St. Augustine, Ed-
mund Burke, and even Aristotle.83 It is a political realism that
does not doubt, like the versions of modernity, the dire conse-
quences of bad choices and institutions even when they may be
tolerated or, more rarely, legalized under the principle of the
lesser evil. When this toleration or legalization exempts itself
81. "Now human law is framed for the multitude of human beings, the majority
of whom are not perfect in virtue." THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 1, I-II, question 96,
art. 2.
82. "The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but grad-
ually." Id.
83. See generally HERBERT DEANE, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE
(1956).
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from the rule of truth and gradualness, then it shades into the
principle of modernity, according to which what is legal is also
what is moral because it has no other source but the autono-
mous human will.
III. DISCOURSE ON LI W CANNOT PRESCIND FROM
DISCOURSE ON ENDS
This analysis means that these distinctions of natural law,
jus gentium, and civil law account both for common principles of
reason by which all men in all societies are bound. These prin-
ciples subject to this same reason the areas of variety and dif-
ference that are found in practice and in culture without reduc-
ing them to purely relativist diversities. The argument for the
variability of many political and social things ought not to mili-
tate against the equally valid argument for reasonable consid-
eration of universal and common things.
The law of nations, as we have seen, is, in its philosophic
sense, that argument designed to foster and protect common
institutions of reason and judgment against the notion that
civil society is at best a necessary evil and at worst a positive
danger to mankind. On the other hand, the relation of natural
law to thejus gentium is designed to guarantee that no civil soci-
ety can escape from the judgment of itself, both by others and
by its own citizens. The law of nations means and demands a
constant pressure toward natural law, to that which is reason-
able in particular circumstances of polity in time and place.84
One final consideration is worth adding to these reflec-
tions on the jus gentium. This is the fact that political life, to
which human law is ordained, while worthy in itself, is not sim-
ply related to itself. The life of leisure, the life beyond politics,
as it were, the end of politics, as Aristotle knew, requires that
we think about these higher things. The medieval writers re-
marked that the active life of politics was ordained to the con-
templative life of truth. This means that the truth of what goes
84. In the words of Fr. de Aguilar,
[t]he constraining force of the law of nations is intimately connected with
the natural law. For as necessity was the basis of the latter's compulsive
power, so the obligation of the law of nations is based on its relative or
hypothetical necessity for the observance of the natural law, from which it
arises as a rational deduction.
de Aguilar, supra note 20, at 209.
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on in political life, including legal affairs, needs to be reflected
upon and this in the light of first principles and how they relate
to institutions, customs, laws, and activities. This reflection
ought to be the classic mission of the universities and law
schools, though the intellectual freedom and conditions of
these institutions often leave this mission in other hands.
Josef Pieper wrote, in his remarkable little essay, The Pur-
pose of Politics,85 that our practices need to be considered in the
light of our highest purposes and ends. He wrote that "prac-
tice does become meaningless the moment it sees itself as an
end in itself. For this means converting what is by nature a
servant into a master-with the inevitable result that it no
longer serves any useful purpose."86 We recognize here, on
reflection, Aquinas's statement that thejus gentium is a matter
of first principles and necessary connections, of clarity of rea-
son which applies to men wherever they think to live together.
Without this connection to rational reflection, politics becomes
a kind of "empty deadliness" and law a mere compromise
among competing policies and "interests."
Josef Pieper next recalled the old scholastic dictum from
Aristotle: "It is requisite for the good of the human community
that there should be persons who devote themselves to the life
of contemplation. '8 7 Some at least need to be free to consider
the logic even of our institutions and activities, as well as of the
truth of being as such. "It is contemplation," Pieper con-
cluded, "which preserves in the midst of human society the
truth which is at one and the same time useless and the yard-
stick of every possible use; so it is also contemplation which
keeps the true end in sight, gives meaning to every practical act
of life."88 The upholding of the law itself, in other words, is
not merely a question of proper political judgment and action,
but also of philosophical understanding and argument.
If we reflect on the meaning ofjus gentium as it relates to
the natural, civil, eternal, and divine laws, we see that present
in it is this recurring force of reason. This reason is free of any
civil law. It can consider any civil law in its consequences and
85. PIEPER, The Purpose of Politics, JOSEF PIEPER-AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 10.
86. Id. at 122; see JosEF PIEPER, LIVING THE TRUTH: THE TRUTH OF ALL THINGS,
supra note 35; see also JOSEF PIEPER, REALITY AND THE GOOD, supra note 35.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 123.
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in its formulation, not as something merely coming from the
autonomous will of legislators orjudges empowered to act, but
as a reflection of reason, of a clear and courageous statement
to the minds of the nations about the meaning of their laws in
the context of what human life is. This meaning is understood
in the light of that contemplation, which, as Aristotle said in
the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics, is our proper purpose
for being human in the first place.89 This purpose is found
originally in our being, not in our law. It is a purpose itself
rooted in the cause of what is in the first place. The noble tra-
dition of thejus gentium remains the challenge that anyone who
would reflect on civil and international law must ultimately
propose to himself.
89. As Aristotle said,
[blut we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human
things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make
ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the
best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power
and worth surpass everything.
ARIsToTE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs, 1177b31-78a2 (Richard McKeon ed.).
